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Envtl. Defense Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003)
(upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's Phase II rule
under the Clean Water Act, but remanding for revision portions of the
rule which allowed polluters to design their own stormwater programs
with minimal review, and which allowed the EPA not to disclose
Notices of Intent to comply with the Phase II rule).
The Texas Cities Coalition on Stormwater, the Texas Counties
Stormwater Coalition (together "Municipalities"), Environmental
Defense Center ("Environmentalists"), the American Forest and Paper
Association ("AFPA") and the National Association of Home Builders
("NAHB") challenged an administrative rule promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Natural Resources Defense Council intervened on
behalf of Environmental Defense Center. Three separate suits arose in
the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and these suits were consolidated into a single suit heard by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Phase II rule, developed in response to the severe pollution
caused from storm water runoff, subjected pollutant discharges from
small municipal storm sewers and construction sites one to five acres in
size to the requirements of the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System. Under the rule, municipalities could evidence
their intent to comply with a general permit issued by an NPEDS
permitting authority by filing a Notice of Intent ("NOI"), or could
apply for an individual permit. General permits establish emissions
limits and technological requirements for multiple similar dischargers.
In either case, the rule required municipalities to develop waste
management plans containing six minimum measures: (1) education
on stormwater impacts, (2) encouraging the public to participate in
development of stormwater programs, (3) stopping illicit discharges,
(4) reducing emissions from one-acre or larger construction sites, (5)
reducing water quality impacts to a minimum, (6) reducing pollution
runoff from municipal activities. Municipalities could alternatively
seek permits through a process not requiring regulation of third
parties including illicit dischargers and small construction sites.
Construction sites could either comply with the general rule or obtain
individual permits. The court determined that AFPA lacked standing
because it failed to demonstrate actual imminent harm, and dismissed
most of the twenty-two challenges against the rule.
The court
remanded portions of the rule allowing limited oversight of
stormwater programs, and allowing approval of NOl's without public
comment.
The Municipalities raised several constitutional challenges to the
rule.
First, they argued that the EPA lacked congressional
authorization to develop a permitting program under the CWA. They
based this argument on the language in section 402 of the CWA
allowing programs to contain performance elements and guidelines,
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but which was silent as to permits. The court read this portion of the
CWA as establishing baseline requirements for programs rather than
listing the only factors that the EPA could use in developing programs,
and interpreted the omission of permits as an indication of the
flexibility granted to the EPA. The Municipalities also argued that the
EPA lacked authority because express language required permits for
large and medium municipal storm sewers, but no requirement
existed for small municipal storm sewers. The court held that a
provision for a moratorium on small emitters necessarily implied that
the EPA possessed authority to require permits after the moratorium
expired.
The Municipalities also argued the rule violated the Tenth
Amendment by forcing them to regulate third parties as a part of a
federal regulatory program. The court dismissed this claim, holding
the rule was not unduly coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment
because Municipalities could select alternative permitting not
requiring regulation of third parties.
The Municipalities challenged the provision requiring public
education arguing that it compelled municipal storm sewers to express
the political message of the EPA in violation of the First Amendment.
The court held that the required message about safe disposal of waste
was not ideologically grounded and as a result did not require the
municipal storm sewers to endorse a particular belief.
The Municipalities further asserted that the EPA failed to comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provisions for notice
and comment on proposed rules because the EPA omitted the
individual permit option from the proposed rule. The court held that
the EPA gave sufficient notice and opportunity for comment because it
had suggested an individual permit option in the proposed rule, and
therefore the final rule contained no elements absent from the
proposed rule.
The Environmentalists challenged the rule claiming that it
provided insufficient oversight and allowed polluters to design and
self-enforce their own programs. According to the Environmentalists,
the rule contravened the CWA command to maximally reduce
pollution. The court agreed, holding that stormwater programs
required review by the EPA to ensure that polluters sufficiently
reduced emissions.
In addition, the Environmentalists challenged the rule because
they claimed it denied the public opportunity to participate as
required by the CWA. The court determined that the EPA must make
NOI's submitted by municipal storm sewers public to provide a
sufficient hearing. Under the Phase II rule, NOI's contained all of the
relevant information about how pollution reduction would take place
and therefore necessitated public comment. As a result, the court
vacated the procedural portion of the rule allowing the EPA to prevent
public comment on NOI's and remanded the rule to the EPA for
action consistent with the CWA.
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The Environmentalists also claimed that the EPA's failure to
designate certain industries and forest roads under the regulation, and
failure to regulate forest roads violated the APA as arbitrary and
capricious decisions. With regard to the EPA's failure to designate
industries and forest roads, the court found the EPA acted reasonably
and established a rational connection because it possessed insufficient
data to justify nationwide designation. As a result, the court deferred
to the EPA's determination. With regard to the EPA's failure to
regulate forest roads, the court held the Environmentalists had
standing to challenge the decision. Because the EPA failed to address
the merits of the challenge, the court remanded the issue to the EPA
for consideration.
NAHB claimed that the EPA promulgated the Phase II rule
without necessary consultation with state governments. The court
found the EPA met its duty to consult states by circulating draft copies
of the final rule to state and local governments, and revising the rule
based upon the comments received. That some states and localities
disagreed with the rule did not disprove the EPA's consultation with
states.
NAHB also asserted the EPA acted in contravention of the CWA by
failing to base its Phase II rule on section 402 studies. NAHB claimed
the CWA required the EPA to solely base its program on studies, and
that the EPA failed to do so, instead basing its designation partially on
input from the public and additional research. The court determined
that NAHB had standing based on its assertion that the EPA failed to
comply with procedural requirements. On the merits, the court
affirmed the EPA's rule holding that the statute required the EPA to
base its program on studies and on consultation, and to make use of
all sources of information.
The Municipalities challenged designation of small municipal
storm sewers based on population density determinations taken from
the census as arbitrary and capricious because no connection existed
between urban density and pollution due to stormwater runoff. The
court deferred to the EPA and affirmed the rule, holding that the EPA
established a reasoned basis for its designation based upon evidence
demonstrating a clear connection between stormwater runoff and
decreased water quality.
NAHB argued the Phase II rule arbitrarily regulated one- to fiveacre construction sites because the evidence in the record only
considered the cumulative effect of small sites, not their individual
environmental impact. NAHB also claimed the EPA arbitrarily and
capriciously regulated small construction sites by applying different
standards to the small sites than to other sources of runoff. The court
held the EPA made its decision consistently with the record, and that
the EPA could legitimately extrapolate the effects of large and medium
sites to smaller sites. The court determined the EPA did not err in
regulating small construction sites since no evidence indicated that the
other sources of runoff were similar enough to merit regulation.
NAHB also argued that waivers for small construction sites shifted
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the burden of proof to businesses to demonstrate they did not
decrease water quality in contravention of the statute's requirement
that the EPA establish a program controlling sources. The court held
the waiver system was reasonable to allow exceptions for small sites that
would likely not damage water quality.
NAHB also claimed that the EPA improperly retained power to
designate sources of stormwater runoff in the future. NAHB argued
that Congress did not authorize the EPA to retain such power. NAHB
also claimed that such authority violated the non-delegation doctrine
because the EPA developed no "intelligible principle" to guide its
future discretion, and because the ability to designate in the future was
not disclosed for notice and comment. The court held the EPA's
authority to designate sources covered under the rule did not expire,
and that the issue of whether the EPA could designate a source
without determining its eligibility was not yet ripe for review. On the
non-delegation challenge the court held the overall purpose of the
CWA-protecting water quality-gave the EPA sufficient guidance.
Finally, the court held the power to designate future sources was a
logical outgrowth of continuing designation present in the draft rule,
and therefore provided sufficient opportunity for notice and
comment.
NAHB raised a challenge under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
("RFA"), arguing the EPA failed to conduct sufficient analysis and
ignored the substantial cost imposed on small entities by the Phase II
rule. The court found the EPA reasonably determined the rule would
insignificantly impact small entities, and even if the EPA improperly
complied with the RFA, its assessment of the economic impact made
the error harmless.
Justice Tallman concurred in part and dissented in part. He
believed the court should defer to the EPA, allow certain
determinations without review, and approve NOI's without comment.
JaredEllis

Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding National Park Service's (1) Merced Comprehensive
Management Plan violated Wild and Scenic Rivers Act because it did
not adopt specific limits on visitor use and improperly delineated
certain segment boundaries, (2) decision to prepare Merced
Comprehensive Management Plan as a programmatic document did
not violate Wild and Scenic Rivers Act nor National Environmental
Policy Act, and (3) failure to prevent sewage spills was actionable
under Wild and Scenic Rivers Act but did not violate that Act's agency
cooperation mandate).
This appeal arose from Friends of Yosemite Valley's ("Friends")
challenge to the National Park Service's ("NPS") Merced Wild and

